1	Pages 1 - 56		
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
3	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
4	Before the Honorable Vince G. Chhabria		
5	KELLY WILSON,) No. 3:14-cv-1441-VC		
6	Plaintiff,		
7	vs.) San Francisco,		
8) California THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, DISNEY)		
9	ENTERPRISES, INC., WALT DISNEY) PICTURES, and WALT DISNEY GROUP,) Thursday, April 9, 2015		
10	INC.,		
11	Defendants.))		
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13	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE OFFICIAL ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING - FTR 11:26-12:45		
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25	(Appearances continued on following page.)		

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APRIL 9, 2015 11:26 A.M.

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Calling case No. 14-cv-1441, Wilson vs. Walt Disney Company.

Counsel, please step forward and state your appearances for the record.

MR. GIGNAC: Good morning, Your Honor, I'm J. Paul Gignac with Arias Ozzello & Gignac representing the plaintiff, Kelly Wilson. Also present in court with me is Mischa Barteau from my firm, and also my co-counsel, J.A. Ted Baer.

Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

MR. KLAUS: Good morning, Your Honor. Kelly Klaus from Munger Tolles & Olson, and with me are my colleagues, Erin Cox and Jordan Segall.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

All right. Onto somewhat happier topic, perhaps.

Although I suppose that's in the eye of the beholder.

I guess my reaction to the papers is that, you know, the plaintiff can't get summary judgment.

I don't think it's possible to rule as a matter of law that they are strikingly similar. I don't think that it's possible to rule as a matter of law that they are not substantially similar.

And I guess, really, I mean -- I guess -- and I'm pretty

strongly inclined -- and I guess I'm pretty firm on those two first points, that the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment. It's not -- you know, they can't be held, as a matter of law, to be strikingly similar, that I'm not -- you know, I don't think that it can be held, as a matter of law, that they're not substantially similar.

And so I think the only issue, really, that we need to discuss today is access. And my fairly strong inclination is that I can't say as a matter of law that the plaintiff didn't have access.

So Mr. Klaus, I think it's on you.

And, I mean, I have a -- I guess I have a number of questions I won't spit out all at once, but, you know, the main thing is just that people at Pixar, you know, saw *The Snowman*, stood on the stage with the plaintiff, apparently, gave talks about their works together at a film festival and, in particular, the San Francisco Film Festival, but then there's also the Santa Barbara Film Festival. And the fact that, you know, it was shown at six other film festivals.

And, you know, certainly at the San Francisco Film

Festival and at least possibly at the other film festivals

people who worked with Lasseter saw them.

And so the chain of events that gave Lasseter the opportunity to view or copy I think is a lot more direct, my sense is a lot more direct than some of the -- than some cases

that have actually held access, like those couple cases from -from -- those District Court decisions from Illinois, for
example. There were a couple of them.

And it doesn't seem like you have a case where the connection was nearly as close as this one where a Court said that there was no access as a matter of law.

So I guess -- and I do focus primarily on the film festivals in reaching that tentative conclusion. Although I think -- you know, I think it may be that the applications do some work as well, arguably. But primarily the film festivals, I would say.

So anyway, if you could address that.

MR. KLAUS: Sure, Your Honor. And on the film festival are we just talking about San Francisco? Because the Santa Barbara Film Festival, which the plaintiff made a huge deal out of in her opening brief, seems like the evidence for that collapsed when it was clear that everyone from Pixar had --

THE COURT: Either left or not arrived.

MR. KLAUS: -- either left or not arrived.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAUS: So I think we're talking about one film festival, which is San Francisco.

THE COURT: So, I mean, that actually raises kind of a burning question for me that I have about access and the way

But for the purposes of the initial part of our discussion, why don't we limit our focus to the San Francisco

the Courts treat access, but -- and we'll get to that.

Film Festival.

There were people at the San Francisco Film Festival who saw *The Snowman* who worked with Lasseter. Why isn't that connection just right there. What I just said.

And I realize one of the people was -- went on leave and didn't come back, but --

But what I just said. Why isn't that enough to establish enough of a connection to avoid a conclusion that there was no access as a matter of law.

MR. KLAUS: Because the case law -- and let's start with Judge Pfaelzer's opinion in the Meta-Film case. That was the Animal House case from the Central District of California.

What Judge Pfaelzer says there, very clearly, is that the intermediary -- and in this case we have -- John Lasseter was not at the film festival.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAUS: No one, insofar as we know, continued to work with Mr. Lasseter in any sort of creative capacity at Pixar was at the film festival.

The plaintiff deposed Ms. Klaidman, who's the archivist and the director of Pixar University, and -- who said she didn't remember the film, she didn't discuss it with

1 Lasseter --2 THE COURT: But could I just --3 MR. KLAUS: Yes. Go ahead. **THE COURT:** -- interrupt? 4 5 I'm looking at the Meta-Film case --MR. KLAUS: Yeah. 6 7 THE COURT: -- and the judge in that case goes on to 8 distinguish -- distinguishes a bunch of other cases where 9 Courts held that there was access, or that there was a fact 10 issue on whether there was access. 11 And what the judge says is, "In each of these cases, an 12 individual in a position to provide suggestions or comments 13 with respect to the defendant's work had the opportunity to 14 view the plaintiff's work." 15 Why doesn't this case fit that description? 16 MR. KLAUS: Because no one at Pixar was in a position to 17 provide comment on suggestions on the *Frozen* teaser trailer. 18 THE COURT: But that -- so that -- I mean, and that gets 19 to the -- I mean, in these cases, you know, I think we judges 20 are instructed, at the summary judgment stage, to not credit 21 the defendant's evidence on stuff like that. Right? 22 And so it may be that everybody at Disney and Pixar 23 testifies that -- let me -- scratch that. 24 It may be that everybody involved in the creation of the 25 Frozen teaser trailer says, "Nobody at Pixar had any

opportunity to provide me with any input about this."

But we judges at the summary judgment stage, I think, are instructed not to credit that kind of testimony because that's for the jury. And what we are supposed to do is look at the connection and look at how closely connected the people are, without regard to what -- their testimony about what they actually -- what their own opportunities were to communicate with one other.

MR. KLAUS: With respect, I don't think that's true with respect to the issue we're talking about here, which is, as a factual matter, is there any evidence that people from Pixar -- or, again, in Judge Pfaelzer's -- the words of Judge Pfaelzer's order, which this is Meta-Film 586 F.Supp. at 1355 through -56.

Was the intermediary, was that person, in a position to transmit it to the copier, either was a supervisor with responsibility for the defendant's project.

THE COURT: Mm-hm.

MR. KLAUS: That's not true of any of the people who were at the San Francisco Film Festival.

Was part of the same work unit as the alleged copier.

Not true of anyone at the San Francisco Film Festival unless one is to -- unless one concludes that simply because John Lasseter is at Pixar and is the chief creative officer there every person in the company who works with him is deemed to be part of the same unit.

1 THE COURT: What about every creative person? What about 2 every person in the company who works on -- who is creative? MR. KLAUS: I think that in the case -- if that were the 3 rule, Your Honor, then --4 5 THE COURT: And I didn't mean creative in, like, 6 describing their personalities. I mean their job assignments. 7 MR. KLAUS: Yes. And I think that the problem with that, 8 Your Honor, is that the undispute- -- and it really is, it's 9 undisputed here, the plaintiffs don't dispute, that people --10 that Pixar projects are separate from Walt Disney Animation 11 Studios projects. 12 And I think when we look at the other cases -- and 13 frankly, it's the *Meta-Film* case itself. The person who -- the gentleman, Badham, I think was his name --14 15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 MR. KLAUS: -- who worked on the lot, he was a director. 17 THE COURT: Worked on what? 18 MR. KLAUS: He worked on the lot. That was the --19 THE COURT: 0h. 20 MR. KLAUS: The theory was, "Well, I've (indiscernible) 21 my thing off at the lot." He has lunch with people. He has --22 they engage -- they engage in conversations in the elevator. 23 And what the Courts have said is no, that's not -- that 24 is speculation and conjecture and you don't create a fact issue 25 by saying, "Well, they're all in a creative business."

1 THE COURT: Mm-hm. But did Badham work with the people 2 who created *Animal House*? MR. KLAUS: He, I believe --3 THE COURT: Where, in the Meta-Film decision, does it say 4 that Badham worked with the people who created Animal House?" 5 6 MR. KLAUS: Well, it says that -- on the top of page 35, 7 one of the plaintiff's theories --8 THE COURT: Sorry. Wait. Wait. Hold on. Let me get 9 there. Top of page what? 10 MR. KLAUS: 1355. 11 THE COURT: 1355. 12 MR. KLAUS: One of the theories was -- and this is 13 very -- frankly, very similar to the plaintiff's theory here, 14 was that Badham delivered or described the treatment that he'd gotten to a Universal executive, most likely Ned Tanen, with 15 16 whom he worked during the post-production period of his movie. 17 THE COURT: Wait. Hold on. Hold on. I'm trying to find 18 the language. 19 I'm having a hard time finding -- you said the top of 20 1355? 21 MR. KLAUS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Are you looking at the two-column Westlaw or the one --22 23 THE COURT: I'm looking at the two-column Westlaw. 24 MR. KLAUS: So this is -- I use the old PDF style 25 printout. It's the upper right-hand side of the page 1355.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. So it's probably a little bit later in my -- okay. Hold on.

So how does the paragraph start that you're looking at?

THE COURT: Oh, okay. All right. I'm there.

MR. KLAUS: "In attempting to establish...".

what she means to say is torturous -- torturous chain of hypothetical transmittals. Plaintiff speculates that the chain proceeded as follows: Chase Mellon submitted the Frat Rats screenplay to Badham, Badham delivered or transcribed it to a Universal executive, most likely Ned Tanen, with whom he worked during the post-production period of Bingo Long, or, one of those executives, while in Badham's office to discuss Bingo Long, saw Frat Rats on Badham's desk and read it, and then Ned Tanen described Frat Rats to his assistant, Gerald Miller, Miller then passed along this information to Matty Simmons during one of their conversations, and finally Simmons provided this information to the writers of the treatment, Chris Miller, Doug Kenney, and Harold Ramis.

Plaintiff offers this hypothetical scenario in spite of the fact that it's not supported by a shred of evidence, that Badham had no connection with the treatment -- that Badham had no connection with the treatment. (End reading.)

So if your intermediary, by analog, in this case is

Badham, we have two things. One, Badham had no connection with

the treatment. Here, the people at the San Francisco Film Festival obviously saw the work and were on stage with the plaintiff talking about the work.

And then -- so that's one distinction between this case and Meta-Film.

And then the second distinction, I think, is that there is a very attenuated connection that the plaintiff hypothesized between Badham and the creators of *Animal House*, whereas here we're just talking about the people who went to the San Francisco Film Festival working with Lasseter.

MR. KLAUS: I think, Your Honor, with respect, when you say "the treatment," the issue is Badham was the person who received the plaintiff's treatment in the case.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAUS: Badham, who is the analog to the people who were in the audience at the film festival, they saw *The Snowman*. There has to be a -- there has to be a chain of events by which they then described *The Snowman* to Lasseter.

THE COURT: That's for a jury. That's for a jury. The only question now is whether there is a sufficient connection between Lasseter and the people who saw *The Snowman* to justify sending it to the jury on the question of access.

And the standard is, is there a reasonable -- was there a reasonable possibility that Lasseter, or someone else in the creative process for the teaser trailer, had access.

And on summary judgment, it is, is there a genuine issue of fact on whether there is a reasonable possibility.

So in other words, could any reasonable juror decide, based on this connection, that there was a reasonable possibility that Lasseter had the opportunity to view or copy *The Snowman*.

And given the relative directness of the connection compared to the *Meta-Film* case and compared to some of the cases which held that there was access, or there could -- or the question of access should go to a jury, I just don't see how I can say, as a matter of law, that there was no access here.

MR. KLAUS: Your Honor, I think that there's still a -there's still a chain of events that has -- that there is an
implicit chain of events that, as the *Meta-Film* case and others
make clear, is not necessarily for the jury.

And Courts -- the *Gable* case, the *My Name is Bro* case from Judge Wilson, also in the Central District, that make it clear, Your Honor, that one still has to look at what is the -- what is the hypothesized chain of events.

The hypothesized chain of events here is that people who it is undisputed had zero involvement with the *Frozen* teaser trailer, which came -- which started to be developed two years after this film festival, went back to Pixar, somehow got the information -- either directly or indirectly -- to Lasseter

about this movie, that Lasseter at that point viewed the movie and then, two years later, in the face of copious notes documenting the independent development of this -- of this work, somehow reached back -- I think where -- I think the YouTube conspiracy theory is gone now as a result of the analysis of the analytics, but that somehow what happened was that Lasseter, through either extraordinary recall or, say, "Somebody at Pixar told me about this two years ago and I'm going to come up with this," it is -- it is, with respect, Your Honor, pretty fantastical and pretty attenuated.

And the fact that there is a -- and let's compare this to something like --

THE COURT: I mean, it's not nearly as fantastical or attenuated as the connection that I just read to you from the Meta-Film case. Wouldn't you agree with that?

MR. KLAUS: No, I wouldn't agree with that. Because there was a much closer time of contemporaneousness in the case.

And in both cases I think the treatment was done within the matter of a year.

But the point is, Your Honor, in both cases what is the missing element here is some -- some link that says there is some reason to believe that someone who attended this film festival somehow got that information about *The Snowman* to Lasseter and that it was recalled in the face of the evidence

of the development of the work -
THE COURT: But one of the things --

MR. KLAUS: -- when there's --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I was just going to say, one of the things, I guess, that's a little bit different about this case is, you know, oftentimes in these cases you have somebody, you know, submitting a screenplay; right?

And we've all seen the TV shows and the movies about, you know, people who review screenplays and they get sent thousands of screenplays and, you know, it's impossible to review every screenplay that you get sent.

And so, you know, there are certain, like, logical, you know, inferences that you can draw about the import of somebody merely, you know, sending someone a screenplay in Hollywood.

But this is very different; right? I mean, this is -this person's -- Ms. Wilson's short was shown at a film
festi- -- the San Francisco Film Festival, and it was, as I
understand it, competing with the short that was produced by
the Pixar folks.

And that's a really big deal. That's a much more notable, memorable event, I would think, than -- than just merely being one of 20,000 people who's trying to get some producer to read your screenplay.

And it's the kind of thing that you -- I think most people would assume, generates discussion back at the ranch;

right? I mean, you know, you're a Pixar employee, you have a short that's competing with other shorts -- presumably only a handful of them -- at the San Francisco Film Festival, and you go there and you watch all the shorts and somebody wins and you talk about -- you know, and you go up on stage and you talk about the -- you talk about the shorts and then you come back to the office and you talk about it.

I mean, everybody wants to know how it went, who won,

I mean, everybody wants to know how it went, who won, why'd -- you know, what did you think of the winner? What did you think of the other?

I mean, those kinds of conversations, I think, are naturally expected to happen in a way that they don't when some random person just sends a screenplay to a producer.

MR. KLAUS: I don't believe that that's -- there's any evidence in the record, Your Honor, about that being the way that things went down with this film festival.

THE COURT: But that's not the question for me at summary judgment.

MR. KLAUS: No, it is -- I believe -- the theory that you are hypothesizing, which is that would be what is necessary to fill in this chain, is that there was something so extraordinary about the plaintiff's work, or so remarkable about the plaintiff's work --

THE COURT: Well, I wasn't saying that, just to be -just to slightly tweak what you're saying to me. I mean, I'm

not saying that there was something so remarkable about her work, necessarily. I'm also not saying that it was unremarkable.

But the point is that the Pixar employee having a short in a film festival and going up and competing against other shorts, that event is much more remarkable than somebody just randomly sending a screenplay to a producer.

MR. KLAUS: But the evidence on -- the testimony on the screening, Your Honor, is not that this was in the form of a competition, or that there was -- there was nothing awarded to the plaintiff. She wasn't on stage, accepting --

THE COURT: Wasn't there a winner, though?

MR. KLAUS: There was an award for a short category that -- along with a number of others, that I think she either ultimately received or had received before the festival started.

But the event itself, this particular screening at the Kabuki theater, there was no award handed out. The picture the plaintiff has put into the record, that's not her receiving an award.

THE COURT: Oh, no, I didn't think --

MR. KLAUS: That's her with a number of other people who are -- and the other thing is --

THE COURT: I actually didn't even think she won, and that wasn't -- I may be misremembering, but I didn't think she

actually won anything at that film festival either.

But that's not really my point. I mean, my point is just that the Pixar employees going up to compete in a -- or even just chosen to participate in a film festival is something that is much more likely to generate quite a bit of widespread conversation around the office, I would think.

MR. KLAUS: But the person who was -- the person who was on stage, who was Mr. Baena, when you say he went back to the office, his testimony was he was actually on leave from Pixar and he never went back.

And there's no evidence that anyone else who was there had creative involvement with -- directly with Lasseter, number one, no evidence of that, and, number two, there's no evidence that they had anything to do with him with respect to the teaser trailer, which took place two years later.

And the cases -- the cases that have found access in these sorts of theories, Your Honor, like, for example, the Lady Gaga case from the Northern District of Illinois, what you had there is you had a direct connection. The person who had worked with the plaintiff on her song had worked with Lady Gaga at least on the album and he had changed his story.

And so there was a -- in that case, you had -- I would submit -- extremely direct, extremely close connection between the two.

THE COURT: Yeah, I didn't read the case that way but I

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need to pull it back up. This is the one -- it's Francescatti or something like that? Is that right?

MR. KLAUS: It's the Francescatti case, Your Honor.

Yeah. Hold on one second.

THE COURT: Yeah, give me just one second here.

So Gaynor was the -- Gaynor was the person to whom the plaintiff submitted -- submitted her -- her work, as she claimed ultimately Lady Gaga copied; right?

And so this kind of illustrates the point that I'm making. So the Court says, on page -- Lexis page 6 -- so this is just towards the end of the discussion on access.

(Reading.) To reach the conclusion that Francescatti -that the Francescatti song was available to defendants, a trier of fact would have to discredit the testimony of Gaynor, Blair and Gaga, that neither Blair nor Gaga received a copy of the Francescatti song, and further, that Gaynor either gave the Francescatti song to Gaga directly, or that he gave it to Blair and Blair then gave it to Gaga, and discredit Gaga and RedOne's testimony that they independently created the song. (End reading.)

And the Court says a jury could do that; right? Because all this testimony about, you know, to apply the concept to our case, you know, all this testimony about, you know, the people who attended the film festival who saw The Snowman never having had an opportunity to, you know, converse with Lasseter about it or -- and therefore Lasseter never had an opportunity to view it -- and that's all stuff that, under the case law, seems like you're supposed to argue to a jury and get a jury to believe. But it's not my job to credit that testimony, as credible as it may seem on the surface.

MR. KLAUS: There has to be some reason -- with respect, Your Honor, I think there has to be some reason to doubt it. It is -- plaintiff has the burden of showing access. She has to show some direct chain.

And with respect to the -- with respect to Gaynor and the Francescatti case, the reason the Court said that a jury could discredit his testimony that he never saw it was because he changed his story.

He lied to the plaintiff --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAUS: -- about whether he was with Lady Gaga in Paris, helping her with her album.

And when it appeared that it became inconvenient for that to be the fact, he changed his story.

Here you have nothing of the kind. You have Baena who says he never went back to Pixar. His communications with Lasseter in a creative capacity were with respect to the movie *Cars*, which was six years before the San Francisco Film Festival.

1 THE COURT: Could I just interrupt you? Just to be The Lady Gaga -- Gaynor did not work with Lady Gaga --2 3 there was no evidence that Gaynor worked with Lady Gaga on her Gaynor worked with somebody else who worked with Lady 4 work. 5 There's no direct collaboration between Gaynor and Lady Gaga. 6 Gaga. 7 Which, again, is, like, quite different from the 8 situation here. Because -- because the people who went to the 9 film festival worked with Lasseter. 10 MR. KLAUS: I mean, I'm looking on page -- I've got the 11 Westlaw printout of that case, Your Honor, and I start on --12 Sorry. I'm looking for the asterisks. 13 THE COURT: So the --14 MR. KLAUS: Under "Facts," it says, "In January 2010, Lee 15 introduced Gaynor to Blair for the purpose of creating original 16 material for Gaga to use --17 THE COURT: Yeah, but he didn't work --18 MR. KLAUS: "-- (indiscernible - simultaneous speaking) 19 album." 20 THE COURT: But what it says later is that here it is Blair who is the third party. Gaynor worked on the 21 Francescatti song before collaborating with Blair for the 22 23 purpose of providing music to Gaga for the Born This Way album. 24 So it doesn't appear that Gaynor worked directly with 25 Gaga. At least as far as -- I mean, I'm not sure that the

distinction is neither here nor there. I may have taken us on an unnecessary detour.

MR. KLAUS: No. It's an interesting detour, if nothing else, Your Honor. But it does -- I think what there was was a fact issue. Because Gaynor had told the plaintiff that he was in Paris to work with her.

And what the Court -- the Court doesn't say, "I find as a matter of fact he didn't work on the album." What the Court says is, "According to Blair, Gaynor, and Gaga, neither Blair nor Gaynor worked specifically on the Gaga song."

So there's a -- and it's that paragraph about the recanting.

THE COURT: Right. Right. Right.

MR. KLAUS: Here, Your Honor -- here, Your Honor, we really have nothing -- we have nothing analogous to that. The plaintiff had numerous opportunities to depose Pixar witnesses who were at the film festival. She chose to depose Carlos Baena, who said he never went back to Pixar.

That's not a fact issue for the jury to decide there. He didn't go back. The last movie he had worked directly with Lasseter on was six years earlier.

She deposed Ms. Klaidman, who was the executive producer and the archivist. And there's nothing to suggest that Ms. -- there's no evidence in the record from which one could suggest that there's something that was false about Ms. Klaidman's

testimony that she went back and she didn't discuss it.

The plaintiff had the opportunity to depose her. The plaintiff culled through numerous documents. What they showed you were communications that Ms. Klaidman had with Mr. Lasseter about exhibitions of the history of Pixar art in various places. Or in Pixar open house. Nothing about a collaborative creative process.

She has the burden on access and she hasn't established anyone, anyone who was at that screening having some direct link with Lasseter on anything.

But then we go to the next step, which is at an entirely -- there's no one, no one who's alleged to have been in the audience had anything to do with the creation of the teaser trailer. Nothing.

And so you do have to have some sort of a link in between the people who went to the film festival and John Lasseter.

So is it your -- wait a minute. Sorry. There needs to be a link between the people who went to the film festival and John Lasseter?

MR. KLAUS: And John Lasseter with respect to the creation of the teaser trailer.

THE COURT: Oh, no. See, I think there needs to be a link between the people who went to the film festival and John Lasseter. And more than just -- you know, I mean, it's -- you know, it's to be distinguished from a situation where, you

know, like the whole idea of Bayer corporate receipt is not enough; right? But this is more than Bayer corporate receipt. This is, you know, a situation where people went to a film festival and viewed the short and those people worked with Lasseter.

That, you know -- the question of whether there needs to be a connection between the people who viewed the short and Lasseter's work on the teaser trailer, I think that's a question for the jury.

The fact that there's a connection between those people and Lasseter, I think, causes it to go to the jury. Because I'm not supposed to be, you know, questioning whether they had any conversations with Lasseter either about *Snowman* or about the *Frozen* teaser trailer.

MR. KLAUS: It says, Your Honor, in the *Meta-Film* case -- again, between 1355 and 56, either the intermediary's the supervisor -- not the case here, was part of the same work unit as the copier.

THE COURT: That begs the question.

MR. KLAUS: Well, that begs the question, Your Honor, only in the sense that the same work unit that you're describing, under that theory the work unit is the entire studio, or the entire creative division of the studio, which is -- there's no case, as far as I know, that goes so far as to say that simply because somebody is within the same studio they

1 are part of the same work unit. 2 **THE COURT**: Well, but they're creative people who work 3 with Lasseter. Right? I mean, why -- I mean, do you agree that they're creative people who worked with Lasseter? 4 5 MR. KLAUS: I agree that they are creative people who 6 work with Lasseter, Your Honor, but the rule that you would be 7 announcing -- I know of no case that has gone this far -- but 8 the rule that you would be announcing is that anyone who works 9 in a studio with somebody else is part of the same work unit. 10 And then the realities of the situation -- I think this 11 is one of the things that really was driving the decision --12 THE COURT: Well, I mean, couldn't the rule that I -- I 13 mean, why does that have to be the rule that I announce? 14 mean, in this case it's undisputed that they actually worked 15 together; right? 16 MR. KLAUS: It's undisputed that -- it's undisputed that 17 the they -- and I don't know who the -- if the "they" is Elise 18 Klaidman --19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. KLAUS: -- that they worked at the same studio. 21 THE COURT: Together. I mean, they worked together; 22 right? 23 MR. KLAUS: They work in the same building. What they 24 work on is not -- there's no evidence that Ms. Klaidman worked 25 on anything having to do with any movie. Ms. Klaidman is the

archivist. She's the head of the after works program by which they do -- not animated films -- live action films.

These are for Pixar people who are not doing what they do

during their day job. It is an after work proposition.

THE COURT: Speaking of announcing rules. The language that you just quoted to me from *Meta-Film* where it has to be either a supervisor or somebody in the same unit, is there a Ninth Circuit case that adopts that formulation? Or is that just the District Court in *Meta-Film*?

MR. KLAUS: I believe it's not just the *Meta Film's* case. The same language is repeated again in the *Gable* case, which is from Judge Wilson.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. KLAUS: And the law on -- the law on -- and this is also with respect to the nexus that's required, or the close relationship that is required.

You also see that repeated in the *Jorgenson* case, which is from the Second Circuit.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KLAUS: And I think that the general rule -- I mean, the closest case that I think one might be -- because we've -- one of the things we have been discussing so far is how would the initial information have gotten into the Pixar system.

There's still the -- there's still the question of how did that information get to make it through John Lasseter, and

how was it recalled during this one -- you know, the one session on January 15th that it was pulled up.

And that -- I think what you're talking about there -- because I don't think there's any contention that what happened was Mr. Lasseter typed something into YouTube at that meeting, or went through the plaintiff's website, or said, "Get me that Kelly Wilson film that the people were talking about."

It is a question of -- I think what the theory would be, it would be something of unconscious copy. That I saw something or something made such an impact on me.

And the cases, I think, are relevant for you to look at on the unconscious copying point, which is another part of the chain of hypo- -- the chain of events.

THE COURT: That was the *Michael Bolton* case; right?

That was one of the cases, was the *Michael Bolton* case; right?

And the theory was that, you know, it could have been unconscious copying because he had -- I can't remember, what was the name of the band?

MR. KLAUS: The Isley Brothers.

THE COURT: The Isley Brothers.

So he listened to the Isley Brothers when he was a teenager, and this song by the Isley Brothers never made it into the Billboard Top 100, there was no evidence that it ever played on the radio in the area where Michael Bolton ever grew up, but there was evidence that Michael Bolton really liked the

1 Isley Brothers. 2 And the theory was that, you know, 20 years later -- or 3 maybe it was 15 years later or something like that, I don't know -- Bolton might well have copied that song. 4 5 I mean, that connection -- and the Court, as I recall in 6 that case, said that that needs to go to a jury. 7 I mean, that connection seems a lot more attenuated than 8 this one. 9 MR. KLAUS: Your Honor, it wasn't just that. It was 10 that -- I believe -- there was actually testimony in the case 11 that Bolton had said that he wondered if he was copying a song 12 by another famous singer, that there was --13 THE COURT: That's true. 14 MR. KLAUS: He said he was -- he confessed to the fact 15 that he was a fan. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. KLAUS: In fact, there was testimony that -- that the 18 song was playing and was popular on the radio when he was 19 taking a trip to Buffalo. 20 THE COURT: I know, but that's --21 MR. KLAUS: They really went into some extensive detail. 22 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, that's really quite attenuated. 23 I mean --24 MR. KLAUS: Well, I don't know that that -- but, Your 25 Honor, that is -- you're talking about a major popular group,

and the defendant, the alleged copier, who freely admits, "I was a huge fan of this group. I thought I might actually be copying."

That's not -- I don't --

THE COURT: Well, no. I mean, that's -- you're putting those two things together, but they were separate things. One is he -- there were some prior statements where he admitted he was a huge fan, and then there was a separate thing where, during -- while he was composing or creating the song, he said, "Hey, like, is this -- are we recording a song by so and so?", and he was talking about a different artist; right?

MR. KLAUS: No, but -- I'm not putting that together.

Judge Nelson was putting it together in her opinion. I mean, it says right on page 484, after she describes all the facts that were in the record she says, "It's the cumulative weight of all of these facts."

Frankly, what she said was, "This is a very weak case."

THE COURT: Mm-hm. Right.

MR. KLAUS: But the cumulative weight --

THE COURT: But it has to go to a jury. It's a very weak case, but looking at it all in its totality, it's got to go to a jury.

And that actually leads to this burning question that I referred to earlier, wouldn't -- one thing that I find a little bit strange about how a lot of the cases treat access is they

say, you know, plaintiff can establish access in one of two ways. One is that there's a chain; right? Chain of events or a chain of people. The other is widespread dissemination.

And then a lot of times the Courts seem to analyze those two things in the disjunctive.

And a Court might say, "Well, the chain of events is not -- you know, is not -- is too attenuated, so the plaintiff can't establish access or go to a jury on access via the chain of events' route.

And then we look at widespread dissemination and well, you know, the work was out there, the T-shirts were out there, there were 2,000 T-shirts circulating around the Los Angeles County area -- or Southern California or whatever, but it doesn't rise to the level of widespread dissemination and so we're not going to allow the plaintiff to go forward on that theory of access.

That type of analysis seems very strange to me. And it seems like it might be a little bit in tension with Judge Nelson's analysis in the Michael Bolton case.

It seems to me that the question is, is there a reasonable possibility that the defendant had an opportunity to copy or view the work. And I don't understand why we shouldn't view all of the evidence holistically to figure out if all of it rises to the level of reasonable possibility, or could rise to the level of reasonable possibility.

And so as applied to this case -- you know, we've been focusing thus far on the San Francisco Film Festival. But I don't understand why -- you know, it may be that the fact that Ms. Wilson sent her application to Disney eight times, with reference to her website some occasions before she had created this snowman, other occasions after she had created The Snowman, it may be that that, on its own, could not give rise to a holding that the access question should go to the jury.

And it may be that the fact that her film played at eight film festivals, in itself, wouldn't lead to a conclusion that there was widespread dissemination such that you would automatically assume access.

But just because the applications -- the sending of the applications don't, themselves, justify sending the case to the jury, and the fact that the work was shown at eight film festivals might not, in itself, justify sending the case to the jury -- although I wonder about that, but the totality of it all, you know, I mean, don't you add it up?

I mean, it's not a -- it's not a situation where the sending of the applications has zero evidentiary value, it's -- you would assign a value to it in terms of increasing the possibility that the defendants had the opportunity to view it or copy it. You would just say that it doesn't increase the possibility enough to justify sending it to a jury. And maybe

1 you would argue the same thing about, you know, the fact that 2 her work was shown at eight film festivals. 3 But what about when you add it all up? What about when you add up the fact that it was shown at eight film festivals, 4 5 she, coincidentally, sent eight applications to Disney, and there was this interaction at the San Francisco Film Festival 6 7 and a potential interaction at the Santa Barbara Film Festival. I mean, why -- why can -- I guess it's a question to you. 8 9 Can I -- you know, does the law allow me to examine all of that 10 holistically to, you know, determine whether it rises to the 11 level of reasonable possibility of access? 12 MR. KLAUS: I would submit it can't be, Your Honor. Because what --13 14 **THE COURT:** I can't look at it that way. 15 MR. KLAUS: -- it has to be is there has to be a chain of 16 access. 17 THE COURT: And if there is not a chain that is 18 sufficiently close, then I have to just disregard that 19 entirely. And if there's not -- if there is dissemination that 20 is not -- it doesn't rise to the level of widespread 21 dissemination, then I have to disregard that entirely. 22 MR. KLAUS: If -- you can only look at them together if 23 they go through the same chain, Your Honor. 24 With respect, what -- let me --

THE COURT: Does that make sense?

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1 MR. KLAUS: Yes. Absolutely --2 THE COURT: Why? 3 MR. KLAUS: -- it makes sense. Because what -- it is her burden to show -- it's her 4 5 burden to show that somebody who was in a position to actually influence the development, the expression, that was used in the 6 7 teaser trailer, was in a direct chain of having received the 8 information. 9 THE COURT: Well, not on the wide- -- not if you go the 10 widespread dissemination route; right? I mean, if you go the 11 widespread dissemination route then that's the end of the 12 matter; right? 13 MR. KLAUS: She can't pos- --14 THE COURT: Because we presume, we presume that everyone 15 had access, or everyone in the field, or whatever, had access. 16 MR. KLAUS: And the case law is clear that what it takes 17 to reach the level of widespread dissemination is considerable 18 commercial success -- zero evidence of that here; none -- or, 19 ready availability on the market. 20 THE COURT: Why --21 MR. KLAUS: No evidence of that. 22 THE COURT: So -- so I guess I have a couple of 23 questions. Sure. 24 MR. KLAUS: 25 THE COURT: One is let's assume that it doesn't rise to

the level of widespread dissemination. Let's say the fact that it showed at eight film festivals doesn't rise to the level of widespread dissemination under the test that you articulated.

I do still question that. Because I wonder if having your film shown at eight film festivals is -- could be defined as commercial success.

But let's say it doesn't rise to the level of widespread dissemination. I still don't understand the idea that I would then need to throw it out all together.

To say that the fact that it -- the fact that it was shown at eight film festivals has no evidentiary value whatsoever in determining whether it should go -- the question of reasonable possibility of opportunity to copy or view goes to the jury.

MR. KLAUS: Because, Your Honor -- let me see if I can try to describe it this way: If, on -- she has to -- she has to provide evidence of a reasonable possibility of some connection, some pathway.

And in the -- in each of these cases, YouTube, Vimeo, it was on my résumé, I submitted an application, my co-creator submitted an application, on each of those, there are different pathways that she's alleging. There are different pathways to the point of John Lasseter that she's alleging.

One is --

THE COURT: Well, the ultimate question is whether there

1 was a reasonable possibility that they had the opportunity to 2 view. 3 And why is it that we -- and I concede to you that the cases seem to describe it this way; right? That once you --4 5 once you go down this pathway, you can't consider anything else 6 that might fall in -- you know, that might -- you might meet 7 along this path. The other path. 8 MR. KLAUS: If there is overlap, you could consider them. 9 If there was overlap. Of which there's none here. 10 But let me also say the following, which is if, to get to 11 the level of reasonable possibility, someone has to get to --12 let's concede that is something less than what you might say is 13 a probability standard. 14 But if you have, out of a scale of 0 to 100, on one of 15 the chains you have a 5, which wherever you draw the line, 5 16 ain't enough. Five is just a bare possibility. 17 And you have another chain where it goes up to 5, maybe 18 even 6 or 7. Still no dispute. That's just a bare 19 possibility. 20 And so on down the line. 21 THE COURT: And so -- right. 22 MR. KLAUS: At the end you can't combine --23 THE COURT: You can't combine them.

MR. KLAUS: It's a total cheat to combine them and say, "Well, I'm going to take 5 from this chain and 5 from this

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chain and 5 from this chain and 5 from this chain and when I throw them all together, even though they're unrelated chains of supposed access, I now get the 35 or 40 and isn't that clever.

That's just -- that can't be the case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But I -- I mean, that -- that seems to -- I mean, you know, I'm not going to push you too hard on it because it does seem that the cases describe it in the way that you say, although it doesn't seem like any of the cases have discussed it in as much detail as you've just discussed it, or articulated it in the way you've articulated it.

But I -- that seems quite contrary to me to common sense.

I mean, let's say -- I'm going to make up a hypothetical on the fly, so it's probably going to be useless.

But -- well, without trying to make up a detailed hypothetical, let's just think about, like, a case -- probable cause -- a Fourth Amendment case, okay? And the, you know, police officer say, "I had probable cause to arrest this person, and here are the, like, ten conclusions that I came to that support probable cause to arrest this person." One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

And let's say we would agree that no one conclusion, no one factor that the officer took into account would, itself, give rise to probable cause to conclude that somebody committed a crime.

Let's say that no two of the ten factors, when added together, would rise to the level of probable cause.

But if you believe the officer about the -- all ten factors, those ten factors would combine to rise to the level of probable cause so that he was justified in arresting the person.

It would -- it would seem really weird to say, "Well, that's cheating, to combine all of those things."

What's the difference between that and this situation?

MR. KLAUS: The difference there is there's one officer with one brain, there's one officer who's got one mind, but there's a totality of things that are going into whether he thinks the accumulation of those are enough.

In this situation --

THE COURT: But why does that matter? I mean, the point I'm making is not about one officer versus many officers; the point I'm making is more of an evidentiary one. I mean, if you've got five pieces of evidence, you know, it may be that -- it may be that one piece of evidence, or two of the five pieces of evidence, don't, on their own, you know, support a conclusion that "X" but if you take all five and put them together, it does support a conclusion of "X."

And in this case, I mean, let's think about it this way:

Let's say -- let's wipe the slate completely clean in this

case, okay? No -- Ms. Wilson created *The Snowman* in her home,

never shared it with anybody, never communicated with anybody, never sent it to anybody. She's the only person who ever saw it in her life.

What percentage chance is there that the folks at Disney had an opportunity to copy or view her work?

Zero. Right?

MR. KLAUS: On those facts, zero.

THE COURT: Okay. Now let's change the facts. Let's say that everything else is the same. She didn't send it to anybody, she didn't talk to anybody about it, but it was shown at the Sequoia theater in Mill Valley, in one -- in one showing, as a preview for -- a preview to a movie that was being shown there one night.

What percentage chance? Zero or something higher than zero? Maybe one of the Disney people was in Mill Valley watching the movie; right? So maybe .02 percent chance?

MR. KLAUS: What you've thrown in it, in terms of -- I don't believe that -- I believe that the cases say that you can't simply assume that maybe there was a Disney person there and that somehow moved the needle up.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. KLAUS: If it was -- if it was shown --

THE COURT: Well, no. I mean, the cases there would say -- excuse me -- that's not a reasonable possibility of access. But I don't think the cases say that the chances of

the Disney people seeing that is still zero. I mean, it's something higher than zero. It might be .01 percent chance; right?

MR. KLAUS: It is something higher than zero. I would agree.

THE COURT: Okay. So now let's say that her work is shown only at one film festival, the Mill Valley Film Festival.

At that point, the person -- there's a higher chance that somebody at Disney saw it; right? Maybe .5 percent, maybe 1 percent.

MR. KLAUS: I would agree that -- I would agree that the fact that it's shown at the Mill Valley Film Festival is higher than zero. I wouldn't agree, unless there was evidence, that there were some people who were present.

THE COURT: Oh, we would never conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that some people were present. We would never conclude that that, in and of itself, created a reasonable possibility that the Disney folks saw the short.

But the chance -- the chances of them having seen the short are increasing; right?

Now let's say that she never sends her application to Disney, she never attends, you know, a film festival with the Pixar people, she never puts it on YouTube. The only thing that happens is her *The Snowman* is shown at five film festivals -- one in Los Angeles, one in San Francisco, one in

Santa Barbara, one in New York, and one in Dubai.

Substantially more likely that somebody at Disney saw it -- right? -- than if it just showed at the Mill Valley Film Festival.

MR. KLAUS: No. Not unless there's some --

THE COURT: No, I'm not saying -- I'm not saying as a matter of law that it gets her to the point of reasonable possibility of opportunity to view, necessarily. What I'm saying is that if it's shown at five film festivals in the locations that I just rattled off, whatever they were, it -- there's a much higher chance that somebody from Disney saw it than if it was only shown at the Mill Valley Film Festival. Right?

You don't agree, as a factual matter, there's not a higher chance that somebody at Disney saw *The Snowman* if it played at five film festivals, including a couple in Southern California?

MR. KLAUS: I still go -- I still go back to --

THE COURT: As a factual matter. Not as a legal matter.

MR. KLAUS: As a factual matter, I would want to know -and I think the cases require you to know, was somebody from
Disney at one of those film festivals? You're talking about
did somebody -- because it shows at more and more film
festivals, was there more opportunity for somebody to go to the
film festival?

1 Yes, I agree with you, there was more opportunity --2 THE COURT: And therefore, as a factual matter, there is 3 a higher chance that somebody at Disney saw *The Snowman* under 4 that scenario; right? MR. KLAUS: I will accept that under that scenario there 5 6 is a --7 THE COURT: As a factual matter. I'm not asking you to 8 make any legal concessions. 9 MR. KLAUS: I would say that that is a -- there's a 10 higher metaphysical, if you go somewhere beyond .001 --11 THE COURT: I mean, the higher metaphysical, I mean, 12 forget about metaphysical. I mean, do you know anybody on this 13 planet who would say that there's not a higher chance that 14 somebody at Disney saw the work if it were shown at the five 15 film festivals as opposed to if it were shown at the 16 Mill Valley Film Festival only? 17 If these were -- if these were film festivals MR. KLAUS: 18 that people from Disney didn't attend, then the likelihood --19 **THE COURT:** You're changing the hypothetical. That's not 20 my -- that's not the hypothetical. The hypothetical is -- I 21 mean, it's a fairly simple question. I mean, why would it 22 cause you so much trouble to concede that as a factual matter? 23 Why would it be such a problem for you to concede that as a 24 factual matter? It seems pretty obvious. 25 MR. KLAUS: I'm not going to fight the hypothetical, Your

Honor. I didn't think the hypothetical had built into it that there was an increasing probability that somebody from Disney actually attended those.

THE COURT: It doesn't. It doesn't. The only thing we know is that instead of it being shown at one film festival in Mill Valley it's shown at five film festivals in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, New York, and Dubai.

On those two -- are you saying that there's no greater chance that somebody who works for Disney saw *The Snowman* in the second hypothetical?

MR. KLAUS: I -- call me crazy; I am saying that, Your Honor. But I will except, for purposes of the hypothetical -- just to see where we're going with this, I will -- let me go along with this and say that there is some incremental -- incremental or greater chance.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not going to ask you to quantify it.

MR. KLAUS: Okay. So we go there. Then what?

THE COURT: Okay. Then -- so then let's say it's shown at 20 film festivals. You'd agree -- maybe you can't agree to that. But 20 film festivals instead of five. And over the course of three years, instead of in a six-month time frame, shown at 20 film festivals increases the chances even more that somebody at Disney might have seen *The Snowman*.

So then -- but then you might say, "Well, maybe that

doesn't rise to the level of the legal label of widespread dissemination, and so whatever the chances are that the showing at 50 film festivals, or 60 film festivals, or whatever, whatever the chances are that somebody at Disney saw the film, that has to be disregarded completely, that cannot be added to the equation, that cannot be added to the calculus.

MR. KLAUS: Which equation, though, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, let's say -- just for example, let's say I don't know what reasonable possibility is. It's less than 50 percent chance; right? Reasonable possibility is less than 50 percent chance. So let's say that it's 20 percent. Let's say that when you look at the evidence there's a 20-percent chance that somebody involved in the creation of the Frozen teaser trailer had the opportunity to view or copy the work.

And let's say that we were to examine -- we were to look at the fact that it played in eight film festivals, *The Snowman* played at eight film festivals.

And let's say, well, okay, you know, this is a film festival and this is a section on animation and probably a pretty good chance some folks from Disney were there, so let's say that creates a, you know, 5 percent chance that somebody --somebody involved in the creation of the *Frozen* teaser trailer saw it, or that somebody who works with somebody involved in the creation -- works closely with somebody involved in the

creation of the Frozen teaser trailer saw it.

And then we'll say -- okay, so 5 percent.

Then we'll say -- well, we add the fact that Ms. Wilson and her partner sent applications a number of times to Disney.

And let's say that additional fact gets us up to 12 percent.

12 percent chance of access.

And then we add the fact that people from Pixar who worked with Lasseter were directly -- were -- had their short shown at one of the same film festivals that Wilson had her short shown and they were on stage together and they were talking about their shorts together, and that that, maybe -- on its own, that wouldn't rise to the level of reasonable possibility, but when you consider the whole mix of evidence it gets us above that magical 20 percent threshold.

What law -- is there any law out there that prevents us from analyzing it in that way? That requires us to say, "Okay, the fact that it was shown at eight film festivals in itself doesn't constitute widespread dissemination so we have to discount it entirely and we have to get rid of that 8 percent?

MR. KLAUS: So two things, Your Honor. Number one, to answer the direct question, yes, the law is that it has to be a particular chain.

And I'm looking, just for example, at Judge Wilson's opinion in the *Bernal* against *Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency* case, page 788 F.Supp.2nd at 1054. Has to be a particular

chain of events established between the plaintiff's work and the defendant's access to that work.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KLAUS: To go back to -- you know, to go back to sort of a broader point here, Your Honor, there's not just access in the air. Access has to be established either by proof that the plaintiff's work was so out there in the world that it couldn't have been avoided, which we don't have -- which we don't have in this case, or it has to go through a particular chain.

And still, the problem with even accepting -- I want to come back to these because I don't accept them as applied to this case.

But even accepting that there is some greater than zero possibility with respect to any of these, they all go off on different chains. In one chain, you've got somebody who was at a film festival. And what's the connection through them to Lasseter? In another chain, you've got an application that was received by a recruiting department in some establishment of which there is zero evidence that the application actually got past the gatekeeper recruiter and then went to somebody who was in some sort of creative position and that that person ultimately was in a --

There is no evidence of any of that.

And the other thing that the law is very clear on -- and again, this is -- gets restated in Judge Wilson's opinion in

Bernal, is that wherever you measure that line, what you have to have is significant, affirmative, and probative evidence that she bears the burden on.

And on all of these -- on all of these points --

THE COURT: But it can be circumstantial evidence, and it can be -- and the circumstantial evidence can be there was a connection between the person who saw the work and the person who created the accused work.

MR. KLAUS: There can't -- they can be circumstantial but it can't be speculative.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. KLAUS: And here, Your Honor, there is -- there's nothing. There is nothing connecting. There's no --

THE COURT: The connection cannot be speculative. That's the thing. The connection cannot be speculative. That is true.

MR. KLAUS: And there is nothing that the plaintiff has introduced here that makes any connection -- let's start with the film festivals. Nothing that makes any connection between any individual who was at that film festival and John Lasseter or any other member of the *Frozen* creative team. There's nothing. There is no evidence that she has put in to establish what that is.

It's simply, well, they went to see it, they remembered it, they work in the same motion picture studio as Lasseter,

therefore we're going to impute whatever they saw to him.

And that would be extraordinary, Your Honor. There simply would be that level of saying that once somebody from the outside brings that in with their memory that that is imputed throughout the studio to the creative head would be -- it would be extraordinary. There is no evidence to fill that point in that chain.

Going to the next particular chain.

With the applications and sending things in, there is no evidence, none, that any of these -- that any of these many applications got past a recruiter.

In fact, the inference -- I think the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence, Your Honor, is that somebody who sends eight, nine, ten serial applications in a month, and continues to go no- --

THE COURT: It wasn't a month. It was, like -- it was --

MR. KLAUS: Couple of months.

THE COURT: -- four years, I think.

MR. KLAUS: No, I think there was -- there was one period where Mr. Wrischnik sent, I think, five within a span of about --

THE COURT: Oh, let's focus in on Ms. Wilson's.

MR. KLAUS: Okay. Again, she did eight over the course of a couple of years. So I grant you that. There was a little bit broader.

But there's no evidence that these things ever went anywhere, that they ever progressed beyond a gatekeeper.

THE COURT: Yeah. So in other words, you're -- yeah. I mean, I might be with you on that point, that the -- sending of the applications could be zero, or close to zero. If you analyze it the way I think it should be analyzed. It may be that I -- the case law doesn't permit that. It seems like, at a minimum, the case law -- at least the way the Courts intone the test, it seems -- it seems contrary to the way I tentatively think it should be analyzed.

But I'm also -- I'm not sure it matters, for purposes of this case. Because -- primarily of the San Francisco Film Festival.

But can I ask you -- I was curious on the YouTube issue.

I just -- I don't think we need to spend a lot of time on it,
but I was curious about the state of the record with respect to
the person who searched -- who did the search for "snowman and
carrot," I think was the search.

And I think they -- somebody from parts unknown did a search on YouTube using the term -- the words "snowman and carrot." And I think that happened on January 13th, if I remember correctly.

MR. KLAUS: Let me just double check the Declaration.

THE COURT: And I think the -- maybe the person viewed only the first minute of the video before -- (pause.)

1 MR. KLAUS: January 12th. It wasn't snowman --2 THE COURT: January 12th. 3 MR. KLAUS: -- and carrot. It was snowman and rabbit. THE COURT: Snowman and rabbit. Right. 4 MR. KLAUS: And the duration of the viewing was 5 6 zero seconds. 7 THE COURT: Zero seconds? Oh, I thought it was, like, 60 seconds or 54 seconds or something. 8 9 MR. KLAUS: Your Honor, on January 12th, I believe, if we 10 look at Exhibit 30 to Ms. Cox's Declaration, the analytics for 11 that day show --12 THE COURT: Exhibit 30? 13 MR. KLAUS: Oh, I'm sorry. I stand corrected. There was 14 one viewing from California. The duration of that viewing was 15 zero seconds. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. KLAUS: There was another viewing -- there were two 18 viewings that day -- from an unknown region in the US. 19 THE COURT: Parts unknown. 20 MR. KLAUS: Parts unknown. And the view on that day was 21 56 seconds, which --22 THE COURT: And that was the person who searched for 23 snowman and rabbit? 24 MR. KLAUS: Yes. 25 THE COURT: Is there anything in the record that explains

1 why it's parts unknown, why it's unknown where that search was 2 initiated? 3 MR. KLAUS: I don't believe there's anything that's in the record. 4 5 I also think, Your Honor, just to be very clear, 56 seconds into *The Snowman* he hasn't even stepped out onto the 6 7 ice. 8 And the type of copying that is being alleged here -- we 9 haven't talked about that so far, Your Honor, but the type of 10 copying that's being alleged here is not, "I'm going to watch 11 the first 10 seconds or 15 seconds of the YouTube video and I 12 know what the plot is." 13 The type of copying --14 **THE COURT:** But maybe I'm reminded what the plot is. 15 MR. KLAUS: The type of copying --16 THE COURT: If I've seen it -- if I've seen it at a film festival. 17 18 MR. KLAUS: Right. But who -- who has seen it at a film 19 festival? John Lasseter wasn't at the film festival. 20 else, who was in the room when the team brainstormed that idea 21 between January 7th and January 15th, there's no evidence that 22 any of them were at the film festival. 23 There's no evidence, whatsoever, of any connection 24 between anyone who was at that film festival and anyone who was 25 in the room for those meetings in between the time of that.

1 And again, Your Honor, this is one of the reasons that I 2 brought up the 3 Boyz case. Another case that's of a 3 similar -- of a similar type is the George Harrison case involving The Chiffons' "He's So Fine," and his "My Sweet 4 Lord." 5 6 And of course nobody was going to disbelieve George 7 Harrison. 8 But one of the things that -- one of the things that the 9 Court said was this was an extremely popular song. 10 It's the same thing with respect to the Isley Brothers' 11 case. It's one of the --12 THE COURT: Well, except for that wasn't an extremely 13 popular song. 14 Which was the 3 Boyz' case again? Was that the Destiny's 15 Child one? 16 MR. KLAUS: No, 3 Boyz Corp. is the Isley Brothers. That's the name of their -- that's the name of their --17 18 THE COURT: Oh, that's the -- the Michael Bolton case. 19 MR. KLAUS: Well, what some other people call the Michael 20 Bolton case I'm calling the --21 THE COURT: How could you call it anything other than the 22 Michael Bolton case? Sorry. 23 MR. KLAUS: That's okay, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: I'm a big fan, big fan of Michael Bolton. 25 MR. KLAUS: Please don't hold it against me.

1 Your Honor, there is -- again --2 THE COURT: Particularly his Saturday Night Live video. 3 I don't know if you've ever seen Michael Bolton's Saturday Night with Andy -- Andy Sandberg? 4 5 MR. KLAUS: I will grant you that's an extremely funny 6 video. I will grant you that. 7 THE COURT: We actually had another case -- we had a case 8 involving another one of those S & L shorts and stumbled upon 9 the Michael Bolton one and we've watched it, like, a hundred 10 times in our chambers, but --11 MR. KLAUS: I agree with you, that is very funny. 12 But again, Your Honor, here, with respect --13 THE COURT: Back to this case? 14 MR. KLAUS: Back to this case, this is not the -- there's 15 no evidence that *The Snowman* was "Love is a Wonderful Thing." 16 There's no evidence that *The Snowman* was "He's So Fine." 17 Again, it's -- the evidence that it was shown at a film 18 festival, that there were people from an entirely different 19 motion picture studio who attended the event with the people 20 who were up on stage, with the executive -- again, there's 21 no -- there's nothing that fills in the particular chain going 22 back to John Lasseter. There's no evidence. 23 There is speculation. There is a guess. There's 24 conjecture that somebody might have -- somewhere in a cafeteria 25 somewhere might have had a discussion.

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And then you pile on top of that, Your Honor, the idea that at the point at which the brainstorming was going on for the teaser trailer that this video had so stuck in Mr. Lasseter's mind there was some reason to think that it was -- it was so impact-full and so important that it sort of necessarily popped up when the notes of the development and the story boards demonstrate the logical progression and the organic progression of that idea. THE COURT: I mean, the story boards tell a really, you know, interesting story. I mean, I think it's -- I think it's

probably a story to be told to the jury, but --

Can I ask you one other, just, quick kind of nit-picky question, which is, you know, they talk about opportunity to view or copy. That's the language that the courts use, "opportunity to view or copy." And I'm wondering, like, what about the scenario where it's described to somebody? Like, they didn't view it. I guess if, like, just hypothetically somebody describes it to Lasseter. I'm not saying that the evidence suggests that this happened or that it shows that it happened, but let's say somebody comes back from the film festival and describes this in detail, this thing to Lasseter.

He hasn't viewed it, but would that -- would that fit within "opportunity to copy" because it was described to him in so much detail that he -- that that description created for him the opportunity to copy it?

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MR. KLAUS: I don't know -- the short answer, I don't know of any case that says one way or the other whether it would. The description by this unknown, unknown person, this totally hypothetically world of conveying something to him and him having -- Your Honor, with respect, I just think that leaves -- that goes beyond the area of something that is proper to submit to a jury. It's totally fanciful conjecture to say well, maybe somebody went back and described the plot of this work in excruciating detail and it made such an impact that two years later, when he was in a room where people were talking about Olaf going out on the ice, where people were talking about Olaf sneezing his nose, where people were talking about the idea of there being a conflict, that suddenly what you had was this, you know, this miraculous Madeline-eating type recall of what had been -- of what had been said before. And again, the cases are very clear, Your Honor, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the particular chain with

And again, the cases are very clear, Your Honor, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the particular chain with significant probative affirmative evidence. And here the chain -- it simply breaks off at the people who were at the film festival. There is no showing of any connection, there's no showing of them contributing any ideas.

And the type of chain of events that you're talking about here where maybe somebody went back and maybe somebody described it to John Lasseter and then maybe two and a half years later, I would submit that within the realm of the cases

that we've been looking at, the cases that are cited in the brief, there's not a single case that would say that that's evidence that is -- that is significant, affirmative, and probative, and is sufficient to get to a jury.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't think I have any other questions.

Assuming --

Thank you very much.

Assuming this goes to trial -- and I will go back and think more carefully about the stuff that we've discussed today. But assuming it goes to trial, is there anything that I can do for you all at this point on the case management front or are you okay right now?

MR. KLAUS: Well, I think the one thing on the case management front, Your Honor, is -- and I don't know how long Your Honor is thinking about cases to get a decision out. We are sort of on -- the written discovery request on damages have been served. If we're going to have to go down that path of going through damage discovery and retaining experts and the like, that's going to add even more expense to something that's already been an expensive case.

If -- so one question would be, would Your Honor be inclined to stay proceedings pending the disposition of your -- your decision --

THE COURT: No. But would it be helpful if I promised to

get you a decision by no later than next week? MR. KLAUS: I think that would help us. THE COURT: Okay. I promise to get you a decision no later than next week. Possibly tomorrow. But more likely I'm going to want to spend some time over the weekend and early next week thinking about what you've said and re-reading the cases that you've cited. MR. KLAUS: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thanks. MR. BAER: Your Honor, do you wish to hear from me at all on the plaintiff's side, or are you satisfied? (No audible response.) MR. BAER: Thank you, Your Honor. (Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned at 12:45 P.M.)

CERTIFICATE OF CONTRACT TRANSCRIBER

I, Kelly Polvi, certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability, of the above pages of the official electronic sound recording provided to me by the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, of the proceedings taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further, that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Dated this 20th day of April, 2015.

Kelly Polvi, CSR #6389, RMR, FCRR Contract Transcriber

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